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 INTRODUCTION 
That the United States Constitution establishes a single executive is incontrovertible as a 
historical matter;1 a plural executive was debated and rejected.2 As a matter of constitutional 
theory and institutional design, however, this conclusion is far from inevitable and likely 
incorrect. The convention era debates about single versus plural executives exhibited 
fundamental confusion about the relationship between numerosity in the executive, the structure 
of executive authority, and core democratic values like accountability, coordination, and 
uniformity. This confusion is understandable given the extraordinary pedigree of single 
executives in constitutional theory, including, but not limited to Locke,3 Blackstone,4 Hamilton,5 
and Montesquieu,6 and the historical fact that most plural executive regimes were ineffectual 
councils. But the conventional justifications for rejecting plural executives are powerful weapons 
against only some very specific forms of plural executive regimes. Unfortunately, this early 
confusion has been replicated over and over in more recent debates about the unitary executive 
and the scope of executive authority.  
This Article articulates and analyzes the possibility of what we call the unbundled 
executive. The unbundled executive is a plural executive regime in which discrete authority is 
taken from the President and given exclusively to a directly elected executive official. Imagine a 
directly elected War Executive, Education Executive or Agriculture Executive. We show that a 
partially unbundled executive is likely to perform better than the completely bundled executive 
structure attendant in the single executive regime. By better, we mean that the standard 
arguments used to justify a single strong unitary executive in the United States —accountability, 
energy, uniformity, coordination, and so on—actually justify a specific type of plural executive, 
not the single executive structure favored in Article II. Our thesis then is both unusual and 
controversial in that there has been virtually no serious theoretical challenge to the single 
executive structure for more than a century. The entire unitary executive debate assumes a 
cornerstone that we suggest is incorrect and consequential.  
                                                 
1 U.S. Const. art I, sec. 1 (“the executive Power shall be vested in a President of the Unites States of 
America”). 
2 For example, Eldridge Gerry favored annexing a Council to the Executive. In general, participants in the 
Federal Convention were concerned that a single executive would trend towards monarchy on the one hand, but that 
a plural executive would lack sufficient energy and authority on the other. See generally 3 THE FOUNDERS 
CONSTITUTION 491-95 (PHILIP B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, EDS.) (collecting statements of convention members 
regarding single and plural executives).  
3 J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 144 (J. Gough ed.1947) (arguing that not only 
should there only one executive but also a perpetual; Ellsworth, The Landholder, VI, in Essays on the Constitution 
161, 163 (P. Ford ed. 1892) (“supreme executive should be one person, and unfettered otherwise than by the laws he 
is to execute”); 
4 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 242-43 (need for single Executive).  
5 The Federalist 254 (No. 70 Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (energy in single executive critical for 
security and steady implementation of laws).  
6 See 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 163 (J.V. Prichard ed. & Thomas Nugent trans., 
Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1748).  
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The unbundled executive proposal has an air of absurdity to it with respect to federal law, 
but this basic structure is an existing feature of legions of state and local governments in the 
United States. Most states directly elect state attorneys general—as well as numerous other 
executive officers—and dividing executive authority does not usually produce any of the 
pathologies that critics of divided executives suggest.7 Prohibiting an executive from appointing 
cabinet members connotes a debilitating lack of coordination and efficiency. Yet, most state and 
local governments, whatever their faults, do not appear to be debilitated in this way. In reality, 
the closest empirical approximations to the unbundled executive in state and local governments 
seem to produce systematic shifts in public policy outcomes towards public preferences.8 
Unbundling executive authority enhances democratic accountability and government 
performance; the plural executive regime does not cease to function. 
This empirical regularity that unbundled executives produce political outcomes closer to 
public preferences has a natural and intuitive foundation in legal theory. An unbundled executive 
systematically reduces agency problems in representative government by enhancing 
accountability to national citizen constituencies. Unbundling executive authority reduces the risk 
of non-uniform implementation of federal law. And the unbundled executive would be as 
energetic and strong as a bundled executive. Put simply, the unbundled executive performs better 
along the very dimensions that are typically used to justify the single, strong, unitary executive 
structure that Article II articulates;9 that is, the unbundled executive outperforms the single 
unitary executive on its own turf.  
Unbundling government authority does, however, also generate concrete costs, which we 
identify and discuss. We show how and why there can be too much unbundling of government 
authority. These costs, however, must be traded off against the gains in executive performance 
that our system would generate. While we think it implausible that executive authority should be 
entirely unbundled such that hundreds of executives would be directly elected, it is nearly as 
implausible that a single perfectly bundled executive represents the optimal executive structure. 
Given that this is, in fact, the current regime, some rethinking of executive authority is surely in 
order. 
Modern legal theory is replete with detailed and careful analysis of the costs and benefits 
of centralizing or fragmenting authority across branches. The dispersion of power among the 
branches of government is a key organizing principle sounded loudly in the Federalist papers,10 
                                                 
7 Id. See also William N. Thompson, Should We Elect or Appoint State Government Executives? Some New 
Data Concerning State Attorneys General, 8 MIDWEST REV. PUB. ADMIN. 17 (1974). See also William P. Marshall, 
Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE 
L.J. 2446 (2006) (discussing interaction between elected attorneys generals and governors). Marshall’s work is 
probably the closest to our own.  
8 See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions 
(unpublished manuscript 2008) (showing that jurisdictions with more directly elected governmental officials 
produce policies more in keeping with voter preferences).  
9 See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580-81 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Clinton v. 
Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712-13 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
10 See, e.g., Federalist 48 (“An elective despotism was not the government we fought for; but one which 
should not only be founded on free principles, but in which the powers of government should be so divided and 
balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being 
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that also echoes throughout more modern and more ancient constitutional theory.11 There is, 
however, a comparative dearth of scholarship analyzing the internal allocation of authority 
within branches.12 This is unfortunate given that the internal structure of power within branches 
is likely to produce impacts on democratic governance that are at least as severe as cross-branch 
distributions.  
To the extent that this theoretical space has been filled at all in recent years, it has been 
largely the unitary executive debate that occupied this terrain.13 Many pages in the law reviews 
and Supreme Court reporters have been filled with fights over what the Constitution permits and 
requires on this front;14 must the President have strong, weak, or complete hierarchical control 
over all administrative officials?15 What is the permissible structure that Congress may establish 
for relations between the President and administrative officials?16 May Congress restrict the 
                                                                                                                                                             
effectually checked and restrained by the others.”). See also DAVID EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE 
FEDERALIST (1984).  
11 Compare 1 Baron De Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws 163 (J.V. Prichard ed. & Thomas Nugent trans., 
Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1748) (“There would be an end of everything were the same man or the same body, 
whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the 
public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.”) with Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle 
of Separation of Powers, 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 225, 236 (“The substantive interpretation of the constitutional principle 
of separation of powers would reduce to a single, simple rule: Congress may not create a Fourth Branch of the 
federal government.”). 
12 This idea is related to, but also distinct from, recent work emphasizing internal separation of powers as 
an organizing principle for the executive. See Neil Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch From Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006) (arguing that separation of authority within executive 
departments could provide a check on the aggrandizement of arbitrary executive power). There is, of course, no 
shortage of work on the importance bicameralism in this regard. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are 
Two Decisions Better than One?, 12 INTL. REV. L & ECON. 145 (1992) (clarifying conditions under which multiple 
decisions produce superior outcomes in the legislature). See also ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & GARRETT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (2002).  
13 See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi, & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in 
the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 601 (2005); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the 
Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 Duke L.J. 963 (2001); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. 
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1992). See also 
note 16. 
14 See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 710-11 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).  
15 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995); Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41; Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: 
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).  
16 Roughly speaking, this debate has two fault lines, historical and normative. Historically, there is 
disagreement about whether the founders intended a strong unitary executive. Compare Steven G. Calabresi & 
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi 
& Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 
(1992), with Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 
(1994). In addition to the historical question, there is a separate normative question about whether a strong unitary 
executive is desirable on consequentionalist grounds. Compare Lessig & Sunstein (desirable), with Martin S. 
Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996) (undesirable). For variants of the argument that 
Article II’s vesting clause settles question of plural versus single executive, but not strong versus weak hierarchical 
control, see Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and 
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President’s ability to remove an officer appointed by the President? Does the President have the 
authority to negate the judgments of any and all administrative officials?17 Could the President 
unilaterally substitute her own judgment for that of any administrative official?18  
On one view, independent agencies—those headed by officials who cannot be removed 
by the President without good cause—are legally uncontroversial; on the other, they are an 
abomination clearly inconsistent with the explicit constitutional structure.19 This is a good and 
important debate as far as it goes; but as a matter of constitutional possibility, it is meager. 
Constitutional theory can be a bit more ambitious.  
In the remainder of the paper, we articulate and defend our theory of the unbundled 
executive. We survey the theoretical debates about structuring executive authority and show how 
and why the unbundled executive performs better than a single unitary executive. Although our 
discussion is mainly conceptual, we draw on empirical evidence about how unbundled authority 
affects public policy whenever relevant. We clarify the relation between the unbundled executive 
and both current and historical debates in constitutional law.  We also revisit the relevant debates 
about plural executive structures. Our work can, but need not, be read as an attack on many of 
the pragmatic justifications for a strong unitary executive. As such, the work is directly relevant 
to ongoing disputes about whether article II should be interpreted to require a unitary executive 
structure in addition to a single executive structure. These questions of numerosity and 
unitariness have been treated almost identically in the literature; in reality, they are conceptually 
distinct.  
To be clear at the outset, we are adamantly not arguing that the U.S. Constitution does, in 
fact, establish a plural unbundled executive regime. But the sky might not fall if it did. Systems 
of plural or divided executives have long been ridiculed in constitutional theory. If our 
unbundling story is even plausible, there are a significant set of unappreciated benefits to some 
variants of plural executive regimes. Although we estimate the probability of institutional reform 
in the United States to be approximately zero, it would not be nearly as perverse as it first 
appears to design an unbundled executive. If so, taking steps within the given constitutional 
order to bring executive authority closer to the unbundled executive ideal could make for a better 
fit between institutional performance and constitutional values.  
I. UNBUNDLING GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY 
This Part provides a general conceptual overview of the unbundled executive. We explain 
the dynamics of unbundling authority in government, emphasizing the ways in which unbundled 
                                                                                                                                                             
Fall of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627 (1989); Bruce 
Ledewitz, The Uncertain Power of the President to Executive the Laws, 46 TENN. L. REV. 757 (1979); E. Donald 
Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence is so Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506 (1989).  
17 See, e.g., Kevin Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 
263 (2006). 
18 See Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963 
(2001).  
19 See generally Abner Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 123 (1994) (arguing growth of national government makes arguments for strongly unitary executive less 
powerful). 
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authority often enhances democratic accountability. We then provide some empirical 
institutional details about the extent of executive unbundling in state and local governments. 
Although our goals in this paper are mainly conceptual rather than empirical, unbundled 
authority is consistently associated with meaningful differences in policy outcomes in state and 
local government. The degree of unbundling in government matters not just in theory, but also in 
practice.  
A. The Unbundled Executive in Theory 
One of the obvious defining features of the U.S. Presidency is the national electoral 
constituency.20 The institutional design choice to make the President directly elected rather than 
selected by the legislature largely distinguishes the Presidential system from the parliamentary 
system.21 Direct electoral accountability to a national constituency is critical.22 Indeed, elections 
are often said to be the cornerstone of constitutional democracy.23 
Of course, any idealized view of elections as translating popular preferences into public 
policy has long-since faltered.24 Voter ignorance or information asymmetries often undermine 
the use of elections to control officials.25 The very notion of popular will to be translated into 
policy by officials is either incoherent26 or nonexistent.27 Public choice theory suggests a 
plethora of reasons to be dubious of most facets of the political process, including elections.28 
                                                 
20 See Jide Nzelbe, TheFable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
1217 (2006) (arguing framers did not think the President would better represent nationalist interests than the 
Congress); James W. Ceaser, Presidential Selection: Theory and Development 47, 64 (1979) (describing the 
framers' vision of executive power.  
21 See Alan Siaroff, Varieties of Parliamentarianism in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 24 Int’l Pol. 
Sci. Rev. 445 (2003); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633 (2000) (contrasting 
presidentialism with constrained parliamentarianism); Alfred Stepan & Cindy Skach, Constitutional Frameworks 
and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism, 46 World Politics 1 (1993).  
22 See Dennis M. Simon, Presidents, Governors, and Electoral Accountability, 51 J. Politics 286, 286-87 
(1989) (“According to this perspective, electoral accountability is imposed on a systemic or national basis through 
voting which is presidency-centered, retrospective, and result-based.”). 
23 See Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515 (2003) (developing models 
of representative democracy). See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989); AMARTYA 
SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES (1983).  
24 See Sean Gailmard & Jeffery A. Jenkins, Agency Problems and Electoral Institutions: The 17th 
Amendment and Representation in the Senate (unpublished manuscript 1996) (surveying agency problems in the 
selection of government officials and the sanctioning of government officials).  
25 See Douglas R. Arnold, Can Inattentive Citizens Control Their Representatives?, in CONGRESS 
RECONSIDERED (5th ed, Lawrence Dodd & Bruce Oppenheimer, eds. 1993); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC 
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957). 
26 ANGUS CAMPBELL, ET AL. THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960) (documenting widespread lack of information 
and opinions about politics).  
27 See JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION (Cambridge 1992) (public opinion 
created by officials and elites rather than preexisting in voters); WILLIAM RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 
(1982).  
28 See generally DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (Cambridge 2003) (modeling relationship 
between government structures, interest groups, and political behavior).  
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Chief among these is that the relationships between voters and politicians be they 
executives or legislators are riddled with agency problems.29 Because politicians will often have 
expertise that voters lack, politicians will have a significant degree of discretion. If voter 
information is worse than politician information, voters will often not be able to tell whether a 
policy that diverges from their own preferences diverges for good reasons (politician expertise) 
or bad reasons (divergent legislative preferences or self-interest). The agenda control exercised 
by elected officials may also allow politicians to enact policy that systematically diverges from 
voter preferences.30 So long as representatives propose a new policy that is far from voter 
preferences but less far than the status quo ante, voters may not be able to obtain desired policy 
outcomes. Elections help mange or mitigate these agency problems because elections provide a 
mechanism for voters both to select representatives that will take desirable actions,31 and 
sanction politicians who fail to enact policy consistent with voter preferences.32  
With respect to a democratic control of a national executive, elections are clearly an 
imperfect control mechanism. No employment schemes that we know of try to control workers 
by using a single hire-fire decision made every four years. Presidential elections every two years 
would provide greater public accountability than elections every four, but would also generate 
greater participation costs on the public. The extent of slack—divergence between public 
preferences and political decisions or behavior—varies as a function of electoral institutions. Our 
conceptual model holds constant electoral frequency, and instead restructures the executive 
authority that is regulated by elections. Specifically, we suggest there are many benefits from 
unbundling executive authority.33  
What would an unbundled executive look like? The basic idea is as follows. Suppose in a 
given jurisdiction there are j policy dimensions. On any given dimension, the executive can 
choose either a special interest-friendly policy or a voter-friendly policy. A majority of voters 
prefers the voter-friendly policy on each dimension. However, there is an interest group in each 
                                                 
29 ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT 
THEY NEED TO KNOW? 79 (Cambridge).  
30 See Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the 
Status Quo, 33 Pub. Choice 27 (1978).  
31 James Fearon, Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus 
Sanctioning Poor Performance, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION (ADAM PRZEWORSKI, 
SUSAN STOKES, AND BERNARD MANIN, EDS. 1999). 
32 Jeffrey S. Banks and Rangarjan Sundaram, Optimal Retention in Agency Problems, 110 J. ECON THEORY 
1318 (1998); Jeffrey S. Banks & Rangarajan Sundaram, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Repeated 
Elections Model, in POLITICAL ECONOMY: INSTITUTIONS, COMPETITION, AND REPRESENTATION (Barnett, Hnich & 
Schofield, eds 1993); John Ferejohn, Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, 50 PUB. CHOICE (1986); 
Robert Barro, The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, 14 PUB. CHOICE 42 (1973).  
33 See Timothy Besley and John Coate, Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence, 1 J. 
EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1176 (2003); Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, Issue Unbundling via Citizens’ Initiatives 
(unpublished manuscript 2000); Our own revisions and applications are presented in Christopher R. Berry & Jacob 
E. Gersen, The Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions (unpublished manuscript 2007). For other work on 
elected versus appointed officials, see Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or 
Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary (unpublished manuscript 
2007); Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When it Runs for 
Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247 (2004).  
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domain that prefers the special-interest policy, and the group will provide a private benefit to the 
executive if the special interest’s preferred policy is enacted. This benefit may be a campaign 
contribution that the executive can use to improve her lot at election time or a bribe that can be 
used for private consumption. The executive would like to receive the side payments from the 
interest groups, but only if doing so will not cost her the next election. 
Suppose there is only one single elected executive who has responsibility for all j policy 
dimensions. This is the “general purpose” executive familiar in the U.S. context; the single 
executive will be ascribed all the blame and all the credit for executive policy decisions, and 
rightly so. But because elections require voters to make a single elect-reject decision, the 
crudeness of the electoral sanction is a weak way for voters to control the single executive on 
any particular policy dimension. Voters must make a decision on a bundle of policy dimensions. 
As a result, the official can enact special interest-friendly policies in some dimensions, as long as 
she enacts voter-friendly policies on a sufficient number of dimensions to secure reelection. For 
general purpose executives, elections will not completely mitigate agency problems, though 
naturally they produce more policies that are close to majority voter preferences than would an 
electoral system without elections. 
Contrast the general purpose (bundled) executive with the possibility of “special 
purpose” executives. Suppose there are only three important policy dimensions about which the 
public cares. Rather than elect one executive to oversee all of them, the jurisdiction elects three 
executives each of whom is responsible only for one of the policies. When one executive has 
exclusive responsibility for providing only a single policy, e.g., water or sanitation or defense, 
citizens need not aggregate judgments across multiple policy issues at election time. A vote for 
or against the special purpose executive summarizes voter preferences on a single policy 
dimension. An executive who enacts an interest-group-friendly policy in her single domain will 
not be able to placate voters with voter-friendly policies on other issues. Specialized elected 
executives therefore make elections more effective mechanisms for controlling officials; the 
greater the unbundling, the greater the mitigation of agency problems in government.34 In short, 
an unbundled executive is more democratically accountable than a single executive.  
                                                 
34 See generally ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION (2000). The logic of issue unbundling 
has been applied sporadically in other settings. For example, one paper provides empirical support for the issue 
unbundling argument by contrasting elected and appointed utility regulators. Besley & Coate, supra note 33. Using 
panel data for US states, they find that elected regulators systematically enact more consumer-friendly policies than 
appointed regulators. The unbundling intuition has also been used to explain one of the benefits of citizen initiatives. 
See John G. Matsusaka, John G, Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years, 103 J. POL. 
ECON. 587 (1995). For an extension of the implications of the direct democracy argument for the executive branch, 
see John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy and the Executive Branch (unpublished manuscript 2004). By 
unbundling a single issue from a legislative logroll—be it budgetary or policy—voters are thought to be able to 
better ensure outcomes close to majoritarian preferences for the given policy dimension. Id. This same theme is at 
play in the scattered assortment of justifications given for single-subject limitations in state constitutions, for 
instance in Colorado and Florida. Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, Chaos, Direct Democracy, and the Single 
Subject Rule (unpublished manuscript 2006); Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 
67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803 (2006); Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure: 
Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38 HARV. J. LEGISLATION 
103 (2001). The single-subject limitation is supposed to preclude logrolls in which policies favored only by a 
minority of politicians or voters are enacted together. Michael Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative 
Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803 (2006). The logic of unbundling then is general, and we are agnostic about whether 
unbundling in any particular instance is good or bad. In the single-subject context, logrolls could easily be welfare 
2008 The Unbundled Executive  8 
 
If so, why not design an executive structure with hundreds of directly elected executives? 
There is a theoretical limit to the unbundling benefits that can be achieved by executive 
unbundling because there are costs produced by increasing the number of elected executives.35 
Consider two variants: monitoring costs and coordination costs. The addition of new elected 
executives produces an increase in monitoring costs. Each additional officer added to the ballot 
requires additional work on the part of voters. As the number of elected executives grows, the 
costs to citizens of monitoring a legion of public officials may outweigh any marginal benefits 
associated with issue unbundling. 
Although monitoring costs might entail many issues, we focus on two components. The 
first is a function of the number of issues for which an executive provides policy. A voter has to 
determine whether each policy has been set at the level she prefers. This first component is a 
function of the number of aggregate policy dimensions and (importantly) largely independent 
from the number of elected executives. The second is a function of the number of elected 
executives rather than the number of overall issues. For each executive, the citizen must be able 
to identify the incumbent and assess her responsibility for a particular service or services.  
Consider a random voter at the polls. On the ballot, she sees a list of offices, and for each 
office a list of names. The ballot often does not identify the incumbent, and in most cases it does 
not even list a political party affiliation.36 At a minimum, a voter must be able to identify the 
incumbent for each office and match the incumbent to an assessment of the service(s) performed 
by the office in question. Where there is only one general purpose executive, all services can be 
attributed to one official. The voter needs only to know which candidate is the incumbent and to 
form an overall assessment of the incumbent’s performance. Where there are many offices, the 
task becomes considerably more challenging. In practice, it is not at all unusual to find two 
dozen or more elected offices on a local government ballot. We use the term monitoring costs to 
denote the total effort required to evaluate all services in a jurisdiction and match them to the 
relevant incumbent officials.  
In addition to monitoring costs, unbundling executive authority also produces 
coordination costs. When two similar policies are produced by different executive authorities 
without coordination, these policies might conflict or at least not work as well in tandem as 
might be the case if the policies were produced by a unified policymaker. For policies that are 
jointly produced by two specialized elected offices, these coordination costs will be most severe.  
Some unbundling of executive authority should reduce slack, making policy more 
democratic. Too much unbundling could actually increase slack, allowing politicians to 
implement personal rather than public preferences. As monitoring costs increase, each elected 
executive might receive less scrutiny from voters. Officials governing specialized domains could 
                                                                                                                                                             
enhancing so long as the value to the minority receiving benefits along each dimension is high enough. The point is 
merely that the idea of unbundling has been usefully applied in a handful of other legal and policy contexts.  
35 Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions (unpublished 
manuscript 2007).  
36 About three-quarters of local elections are nonpartisan. Brian F. Schaffner, Matthew Streb, & Gerald 
Wright, Teams Without Uniforms: The Nonpartisan Ballot in State and Local Elections, 54 Pol. Rsrch. Q. 7 (2001) 
(“As of 1991, about three-quarters of all municipalities in the United States used nonpartisan elections to select their 
public officials.”).  
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then adopt special interest-friendly policies without suffering electoral reprisals. Similarly, for 
certain subsets of policies, coordination costs could swamp democratic benefits.  
When executive authority is unbundled and given solely to a specialized executive 
directly elected by the public, this is the purest form of executive unbundling. The general 
purpose executive now has responsibility for j-1 policy dimensions and the special purpose 
official responsibility for one. There are, however, intermediate variants, involving different 
appointments and removals schemes which produce more complicated tradeoffs.  
Consider first a straightforward theoretical example. Suppose a specialized environment 
executive is appointed by a general purpose executive. Environmental issues are partially 
unbundled in the sense that one official exists who primarily oversees environmental policy. 
However, because the choice of who to appoint and how to regulate, and when to remove is still 
maintained by the general purpose executive, environmental issues are not perfectly unbundled. 
Part of what makes the unbundled executive intuition attractive is that there is one executive with 
exclusive authority to make decisions about one policy dimension. To the extent that the 
authority to make final decisions is somewhat shared, the crispness of the pure scheme wanes.  
The general purpose executive can obviously be disciplined by voters if, for example, she 
selects a bad environment executive. But the general purpose executive would still be able to 
appoint poor specialized executives on some dimensions, so long as policy was good enough on 
a majority of dimensions. If the environment executive is directly elected, the reelection vote 
only need summarize approval on one policy dimension. When executive authority is parceled 
out to officials that are not directly elected then, things are significantly more unwieldy. Net 
effects depend on whether the authority is exclusive or overlapping and whether the appointment 
is vested entirely in the discretion of one institution or several.  
Now consider the unwieldy empirical reality. The range of mechanisms for selecting 
executive officials in the states is quite extensive.37 When appointment power is given to the 
governor, sometimes no approval from another political institution is needed; sometimes the 
senate must approve; sometimes both houses of the legislature must approve; sometimes either 
house can approve; sometimes a board or council must approve; sometimes only a legislative 
committee must do so. For certain offices, an agency head appoints without approval from 
another institution; sometimes the governor must approve; sometimes the senate or a legislative 
institution must do so. For other offices, a board or council appoints, subject to approval by the 
governor and/or the senate. For still other offices, the legislature appoints administrative 
officials. 
These different appointment schemes also produce different degrees of unbundling and 
therefore of public control over policy. If direct election of a special purpose executive official 
results in the most unbundling, appointment of an official by one institution, be it the governor, 
the legislature, or a state board or commission with the consent of another institution, where 
policy jurisdiction is shared constitutes the least unbundling. In this case, not only can the 
appointed official not be directly sanctioned by the public, but it is not clear which institution 
should be punished for a bad appointment. Standard models of appointments emphasize that both 
                                                 
37 Any volume of the Book of the States contains multiple examples.  
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the nominating and the consenting institution will affect the selection and approval of officers.38 
Without the ability to blame or credit a single elected official, public sanctions will be less 
effective. Moreover, when the appointed official shares authority for policy implementation with 
other officials or institutions, it is difficult to know who to blame for failure or credit for success. 
Appointment of executive officials with overlapping jurisdiction may be desirable for other 
reasons, but there is little in the way of unbundling benefits. Whereas unbundling by independent 
election clarifies which public officials can be held responsible for which public policies, the 
hybrid appointment schemes muddle responsibility. Indirect appointment schemes are less 
effective for controlling moral hazard in politics. 39 Between these two extreme positions fall 
officials who are appointed by a single elected official (usually the governor) with exclusive 
policy authority (more unbundling) and officials who are appointed with the consent of multiple 
institutions with exclusive policy authority (less unbundling).  
Democratic accountability or responsiveness is only one design consideration among 
many. However, it is a particularly prominent one in constitutional design. On this dimension of 
comparison, the analysis suggests that the unbundled executive outperforms the single executive. 
The unbundled executive produces greater accountability in the executive than the single 
completely bundled executive. We turn to other design considerations momentarily; however, we 
pause briefly to show that the unbundled executive is not merely a construct of scholarly 
imagination. Variants of unbundled executive regimes do exist in practice.  
B. The Unbundled Executive in Practice 
The Federal government does not rely on an unbundled executive structure, but state and 
local governments certainly do.40 Indeed, partial unbundling of executive authority is the norm 
rather than an exception in virtually all levels of non-national government units in the United 
                                                 
38 See generally Nolan McCarty, The Appointments Dilemma, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 413 (2004); David C. 
Nixon, Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology, 20 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 438 (2001); Timothy P. Nokken & 
Brian R. Sala, Confirmation Dynamics: A Model of Presidential Appointments to Independent Agencies, 12 J. 
THEORETICAL POL. 91 (2000); Susan K. Snyder & Barry R. Weingast, The American System of Shared Powers: The 
President, Congress, and the NLRB, 16 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 269 (2000); Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice 
and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch Nominations 1885-1996, 43AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122 (1999).  
39 See Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland, Guido Tabellini, Separation of Powers and Political Accountability, 
112 Q.J. ECON. 1163 (1997).  
40 The most comprehensive survey of the impact of state political and legal institutions on politics and 
policy is Timothy Besley and Anne Case, Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United 
States, 41 J. ECON. LIT. 7 (2003). See also, e.g., James M. Poterba, Budget Institutions and Fiscal Policy in the U.S. 
States, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 395 (1996); Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Does Electoral Accountability Affect 
Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits, 110 Q. J. ECON. 769 (1995); Rigard G. 
Niemi, Harold W. Stanley, & Ronald J. Vogel, State Economies and State Taxes: Do Voters Hold Governors 
Accountable?, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 936 (1995); James E. Alt & Robert C. Lowry, Divided Government, Fiscal 
Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 811 (1994); James M. Poterba, 
State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics, 102 J. POL. ECON. 799 (1994); 
G. Bingham Powell, Jr. & Guy D. Whitten, A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the 
Political Context, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 391 (1993); Arend Lijphart, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 
1945-85, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 481 (1990); Alessandro Lizaeri & Nocola Persico, The Provision of Public Goods 
Under Alternative Electoral Incentives, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 225 (1990); John E. Chubb, Institutions, the Economy, 
and the Dynamics of State Elections, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 133 (1988).  
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States, of which there are more than 80,000. Authority that the governor or mayor would 
otherwise exercise is frequently given to a specific state or local officer. Often these officers are 
directly elected by the public. Other times they are elected by the legislature; other times still, 
they are appointed by another state official. These arrangements are only approximations of the 
unbundled executive ideal because they there is residual responsibility or authority for the policy 
in the general purpose executive. Still, as executive authority is even partially unbundled, and 
primary responsibility for specific policy domains is given to a directly elected official, policy 
outcomes should move closer to public preferences along that dimension. Both the general 
purpose and the special purpose executives should be more responsive to public preferences.  
To give a sense of the institutional variation which we are describing, Table 1 presents 
aggregate measures from the Census of Government, revealing that there were nearly 19,000 
elected officials in state governments as of 1992. Of these, members of state legislatures 
represented roughly 7,500 and members of other elected state boards accounted for another 
1,300. The majority of state officials fell into the other category, comprising those individual 
elected offices outside any board or legislative body. The bulk of these are unbundled executives.  
Interestingly, the number of these independent elected officials grew spectacularly from 
1967 to 1992, more than doubling from 4,200 to over 10,000. In comparison to the national 
government, it is perhaps startling that there are more elected state officials outside the state 
legislature than within it. This trend is new, emerging only within the past 40 years. Moreover, 
the variation in executive unbundling across states is, if anything, even more dramatic than the 
changes over time, as evidenced in Tables 2 and 3. There are only 80 state elected officials in 
Delaware, while there are 1,200 in Pennsylvania. As of 1992, New Jersey had only one elected 
official outside the state legislature (that is, the governor), whereas four other states—Texas, 
Pennsylvania, New York, and Florida—each had over 600 non-legislative elected officials.  
Turning to the specific executive offices, Table 4 shows that the governor is the only 
position that is elected in every state. The attorney general is elected in 43, while the treasurer 
and secretary of state are each elected in 38 states, as of 2002. Beyond these familiar offices, a 
number of more obscure executive positions are elected in a handful of states. For instance, 
utility regulators, education commissioners, and comptrollers are elected in less than half the 
states, while the adjutant general is elected in only one. Comparing the figures for 1977 and 
2002, we see the emergence of several new elected executive offices within the past quarter 
century. Banking regulators, election administrators, finance offices, and community affairs 
representatives all joined the ranks of state elected officials for the first time during this period.  
Individual states show substantial differences in the extent of electoral unbundling of the 
executive branch (Table 5). Of the 22 executive offices that were elected in at least one state, 
there is no single state in which more than half of these different offices are elected. Maine, New 
Hampshire, and New Jersey stand out as the only states in which the governor is the sole elected 
executive officer. At the other extreme, 5 states—Florida, Idaho, North Dakota, South Carolina, 
and Washington—each hold elections for 11 different executive offices. The average number of 
elected executive offices per state was 6.7 in 2002, up from 6 in 1977. All told then, state and 
local governments unbundle executive authority to a significant degree, at least when compared 
to the complete bundling that occurs in the Federal government.  
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 Elsewhere, we have estimated the impact of different degrees of executive unbundling on 
public policy.41 Using various measures of unbundling, different estimation techniques, and 
different data sources, the extent of unbundling consistently produces differences in policy 
outcomes. This is true not only from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but also within a political 
jurisdiction over time. Some unbundling produces outcomes closer to public preferences and too 
much unbundling produces more slack. The result holds not only for state government, but also 
for local government structures. This simple empirical result has far-reaching implications for 
institutional design and constitutional theory.42 
II. EXECUTIVE DESIGN PRINCIPLES & PROBLEMS 
A. Background 
Our model of an unbundled executive is closely related to two debates in constitutional 
theory, one active and one dormant. Rather than analyze the costs and benefits of the unbundled 
executive in isolation, we rely on these disputes as lens through which to view the unbundled 
executive model.  
The dormant dispute is whether there should be a single or plural executive. These 
executive numerosity questions are dormant with good reason. The U.S. Constitution clearly 
resolves it in favor of the single executive. In other times and places, this question has been 
resolved otherwise, and our work suggests the single executive position is not the only tenable 
one. Elsewhere there is far more variation in the way that executive authority is structured. In 
ancient Rome, there was a dual magistracy.43 Andorra is technically structured as a duumvirate, 
ruled by two co-princes.44 These arrangements are obviously somewhat different from the pure 
version of an unbundled executive, but comparative contexts do show far more variation.  
The second more active dispute is whether the single executive should have strong or 
weak hierarchical (vertical) control over the execution or administration of law. Does and should 
the Constitution establish strong vertical or hierarchical control by the President over all officials 
that implement federal law? Properly cabined, this is or should be the key question in the unitary 
executive debate. 
A critical additional question only becomes intelligible if the numerosity question is 
resolved in favor of multiple executives. Given multiple executives, should their authority be 
concurrent, partially overlapping, or exclusive vis-à-vis each other. The single versus plural 
debate generally assumes that multiple executives must exercise overlapping authority, and for 
this reason conclude the arrangement produces ineffective or inefficient government. This 
assumption is defensible on historical grounds because most plural executives were councils, the 
                                                 
41 Berry & Gersen, Fiscal Consequences, supra note 8.  
42 Cf. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, An Economic Model of Representative Democracy, 112 Q. J. 
ECON. 85 (1997). See also Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, The Politician and the Jude: Accountability in Government, 
94 AM. ECON. REV. 1034 (2004).  
43 KARL LOEWENSTEIN, THE GOVERNANCE OF ROME (1973).  
44 A.H. Angelo, Andorra: Introduction to a Customary Legal System, 95 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 14 (1970).  
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members of which shared concurrent authority. Once the assumption of overlapping authority is 
relaxed, however, the force of many standard critiques of plural executive systems wanes. 
One reason the unbundled executive appears startling is that these separate analytic 
questions have become conflated. If the single-plural question has been resolved in favor of one 
executive, the unbundling question seems nonsensical. If executive authority can only be 
overlapping, then a plural executive looks ineffective. If one favors a strong unitary executive, 
any plural system first looks unappealing because authority that is not centralized tends to be 
weak. Thus, in this section, we try to keep these dimensions of potential institutional choice 
distinct, matching existing critiques and intuitions to the relevant dimension.  
We emphasize two claims throughout this section. First, any general criticism of plural or 
unbundled executives must somewhat reconcile dire predictions about government failure that 
would derive from a plural executive and the reality of successful state governments in the 
United States. It is possible that state and local governments would be even better without 
unbundled authority, but it is uncharitable in the extreme to describe all unbundled state 
governments as completely dysfunctional. Second, there is an essential difference between 
unbundled authority and concurrent authority as we will show. The most prominent critiques of 
the plural executive model target schemes in which several executives act in consort with 
overlapping authority. Such schemes may well produce government dysfunction, 
unaccountability, or trend towards tyranny, but the unbundled executive does not. 
B. Executives, Single and Plural 
The reasons that a plural executive regime was rejected and a single executive regime 
embraced are many. But there are only a handful of recurrent themes that truly dominate this 
debate. First and foremost is a suggestion that single executives are democratically accountable; 
plural executives are not. As we have now repeatedly suggested, this is simply a mistake 
deriving from confusion about what features of plural executives are necessary and which are 
merely common. Single executives are also said to be better at providing uniformity and 
coordination in the implementation of law.45 Single executives are often to be required by the 
inherent nature of policy issues that constitute important cores of executive authority, like war 
and trade. A common suggestion in the convention era debates was that only a single executive 
could provide the energy strength, and agility necessary to sustain the fledgling executive 
branch; another, that something inherent in the notion of separation of powers requires a single 
executive.46 Each of these ideas has an intuitive superficial appeal, but each is also wrong, or at 
least not quite right. Along virtually all of these dimensions the unbundled executive performs as 
well or better than the single executive. When considered as a whole, rather than dimension by 
dimension, the case for the unbundled executive is all the stronger. Our discussion no doubt loses 
much of the nuance in these complex debates. Nonetheless, we attempt to address the most 
common collection of relevant ideas and arguments related to numerosity and unitariness.  
                                                 
45 Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16.  
46 See Calabresi, supra note 16. Although Calabresi is focused on the question of executive unitariness 
rather than singularity, most of these ideas were levied against plural executives. The application to unitariness is 
probably the extension rather than vice versa.  
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1. Accountability 
The most frequent argument in favor of a single and strong executive has to do with 
democratic accountability. The President is the only elected official with a truly national 
constituency. Multiple executives would create confusion and ambiguity about which officials 
were responsible for what policy. The same claim is made with respect to independent agencies 
in the unitary executive debate. The inability to impose electoral sanctions would undermine the 
democratic process, debilitating the ability of voters to select and discipline politicians, or so the 
argument goes. Hamilton articulated this idea with some force:  
But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as 
much against the last as the first plan, is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy 
responsibility. . . . It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine 
on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious 
measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, 
and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the 
real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or 
misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of actors who 
may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the 
whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to 
whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.47 
Whether or not this passage supports the strong unitary executive vision as it is sometimes taken 
to do,48 it clearly favors a single rather than plural executive. The underling ideas are intuitive 
and the rhetoric powerful, but in our view, the central claim is simply incorrect. It assumes a 
plural executive must entail overlapping or concurrent authority rather than exclusive authority. 
When multiple parties share authority, it may in fact be difficult to assign blame or credit. But as 
noted above, the single versus plural executive dimension is conceptually distinct from the 
overlapping versus exclusive jurisdiction dimension.49 In theory at least, it is straightforward to 
construct a plural executive with exclusive authority or jurisdiction. Our model of the unbundled 
executive does just that.  
True, as a historical matter, the multiple executive structures of which we are aware 
usually did entail overlapping authority, and therefore, this slippage is understandable. It is also 
true that when authority for a policy is given to many actors, none of whom is clearly in control, 
it will be difficult for voters to blame any single official and impose electoral sanctions 
accordingly. This idea from No. 70 was echoed elsewhere in the convention era debates, along 
with familiar claims about shirking and free riding in multi-member bodies. “We well know 
what numerous executives are. We know there is neither vigor, decision, nor responsibility, in 
                                                 
47 Id.  
48 See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 732; 
Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century, 47 Case W. Res. 
1451, 1487 (1997) (exploring unitary executive in the republic).  
49 Cf. Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. 
REV. 201 (2007) (clarifying the distinction between overlapping, concurrent, and exclusive agency authority in the 
context of administrative law).  
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them.”50 These arguments were offered again and again against those who favored executive 
councils. Indeed, this is part of the difficulty with using elections to sanction officials in the 
legislative branch: it is a multi-member body and when multi-member bodies fail, parsing 
responsibility is difficult.  
The simple difference between the unbundled executive on the one hand, and the typical 
plural executive critiqued by political and legal theorists on the other, is that the former involves 
(more or less) exclusive authority of the individual executives, while the latter entails (more or 
less) overlapping authority. The unbundled executive would involve parceling it out to well-
identified and directly elected officials, which facilitates rather than undermines the democratic 
process—clarifying authority rather than ambiguating it. To reiterate an earlier point, a vote for 
or against a Presidential candidate is remarkably crude; it is a weighted average of voter approval 
of dozens if not hundreds of policy dimensions. A vote for or against an elected Secretary of 
Education is less so. Directly electing one official to oversee one policy does not obviously 
create more democratic slack than electing one official to oversee hundreds of policies. So long 
as unbundling is coupled with exclusive authority within a jurisdiction, the unbundled executive 
is preferable on accountability grounds. 
2. Functional Duties & Single Executives  
Even if the unbundled executive serves state and local governments well, maybe the 
characteristics of the national presidency differ in critical ways. For example, one frequent 
assertion is that functional characteristics of the national presidency demand that one single 
individual have all executive authority. Governors, for example, do not manage armed conflicts 
or foreign policy; they do not negotiate with other sovereign states. When war and peace are at 
stake, it is especially important that the country speak with one voice capable of quick and 
decisive action. In the same way that spreading across multiple institutions slows the pace of 
action when a rapid response is required,51 dispersing this authority among multiple executives 
does so as well. Controlling militaries and dealing with war requires a single strong executive.52 
To start with, we note a minor historical point. In the 1700s, the single versus plural 
executive issue was distinct from whether the executive should have authority to make war or 
peace (exclusively or concurrently). Pickney, for example, favored a single vigorous executive, 
but did not want the executive power to entail authority to make war and peace.53 A single 
executive did not necessarily imply the power to make wars; the power to make war did not 
necessarily prohibit a plural executive. Others favored an independent but plural executive.54 
                                                 
50 James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (4 Dec. 1787), Elliot 2:480 (excerpted at 3 THE 
FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 501).  
51 Cf. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE (2007).  
52 See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE 
L. J. 231 (2001).  
53 See Records of the Federal Convention, 1:64, 68, Madison, 1 June (“Mr. Pickney was for a virgorous 
Executive but was afraid the Executive powers of the existing Congress might extend to peace & war &c which 
would render the Executive a monarchy, of the worst kind, towit an elective one.”). 
54 See, e.g., 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 60 (Herberg J. Storing, ed., 1981) (view of William 
Symmes). See generally Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 16, at 604-06.  
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These questions are related, of course, but one does not dictate the other, either as a matter of 
theory or history.  
Nonetheless, suppose we assume foreign relations as a policy issue does require that a 
single individual exercise ultimate control, and that being commander in chief is similar in this 
respect. Nothing in this view implies that a single executive should have control over all 
executive authority. It means only that each individual policy of this sort should be controlled by 
one executive official. The claims about rapid response or speaking with one voice—even if 
correct—mean only one executive officer should have exclusive policy jurisdiction in the 
relevant domain; they support a single executive within a policy dimension, but not necessarily 
across policy dimensions. 
The critical question from the unbundled executive perspective is whether one single 
individual should have authority over this entire set of executive policies. To give a purely 
hypothetical example, it is easy to imagine a case in which voters might wish to remove, say, the 
Secretary of Defense over the conduct of a failed war without at the same time replacing the 
President. When the two offices are bundled together under a unitary executive, voters must 
make a single elect-reject decision in the presidential election. If the Secretary of Defense were 
directly elected, voters could express displeasure over the war without throwing out a President 
who was succeeding on many other dimensions. This confusion about the relationship between 
numerosity and exclusivity in government authority are common; the unbundled executive helps 
clarify matters, or so we hope.  
3. Energy 
Energy is another important principle used to support both the single executive and later 
the unitary executive.55 Many of the framers were explicitly concerned with designing a national 
executive with sufficient energy, fearing a national government that was too weak would 
crumble. In Federalist No. 37, for example, Madison argued that “[e]nergy in Government is 
essential to that security against external and internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary 
execution of the laws, which enter into the very definition of good Government.”56 Hamilton 
went further:  
Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good 
government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign 
attacks: It is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws, to the 
protection of property against those irregular and high handed combinations, 
which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice, to the security of liberty 
against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction and of anarchy.”57 
The trouble with this view is that there is slippage between the claim that one individual with 
control over one policy will be optimally energetic and the conclusion that one individual with 
control over all relevant policies will be optimally energetic. We are aware of no especially 
compelling reason that a single executive with authority over j policy dimensions would be more 
                                                 
55 Calaresi, supra note 16.  
56 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
57 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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energetic—in the parlance of the founders—than k executives each of whom has exclusive 
responsibility for one dimension. If the claim were correct, then legions of state and local 
governments are “suboptimal” on the energy dimension. Perhaps so, but the extent of state and 
local government failure is not particularly high. If the U.S. states constitute fifty data points of 
government continuity and the national government one, it seems odd to conclude that the fifty 
have insufficiently energetic governments, and the one does not.  
More plausible is that there is something akin to economies of scale in executive 
authority, which makes control of j policy dimensions by one executive more efficient than 
control by k executives. If so, then it is suboptimal to entirely unbundle executive authority, but 
we have already said as much above. Moreover, just as the corner solution of complete 
unbundling is unlikely to be optimal, so too is the opposite corner solution of no unbundling. 
More likely, at least in our view, is that the relevant economies of scale suggest that some 
executive unbundling is better than none or all.  
4. Balance of Powers  
If energy alone does not justify a single executive, perhaps the background separation of 
powers in the constitutional structure does indirectly. In order for each branch to guard against 
infractions by the others, maybe a single executive is required. One idea on this front is 
historical: because of the inherent weakness of the President and the relative strength of the 
legislature during the founding era, institutional features needed to be calibrated to ensure a 
balance between the two. For example, bicameralism was necessary to weaken the legislative 
branch and a strong single and unitary executive was needed to strengthen the President to create 
rough parity.58  
The problems with this view are extensive. A first mistake is conceptual, equating 
strength with a lack of numerosity. Three executives who cannot agree are surely weaker than 
one executive, but three executives of similar mind, acting in consort, are not obviously so. If 
anything, they would seem as strong as or stronger than one executive. Alternatively, claiming 
the founders worked ardently to strengthen the executive borders on disingenuous. Some sought 
a strong executive and favored a single executive for that reason; others were concerned that a 
single executive naturally trends towards monarchy, a result to be avoided.59 Indeed, the ideas 
seem an odd overlay to inter-branch relations in the 1700s. The President had comparatively 
narrow authority and resources: granting one President strong hierarchical control over virtually 
nothing seems a peculiar corrective to concerns about a too-powerful Congress. 
Alternatively, perhaps the relevant claim is that a single executive is necessary to protect 
against incursions by an aggressive legislature. Balance of powers would be one criterion here, 
but not the only one. The real question is how well a given executive structure would be able to 
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59 See 1 THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION 64, 68, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (quoting report 
of Madison, 1 June) (“Mr. Randolph strenuously opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy. He regarded it as the 
foetus of monarchy.”). On the other hand, there was skepticism about growth of authority of a plural executive as 
well. See id. 1:74; Pierce, June 2) (“Mr. Wilson said that in his opinion so far from a unity of the Executive tending 
to progress towards a monarchy it would be the circumstance to prevent it. A plurality in the Executive of 
Government would probably produce a tyranny as bad as the thirty Tyrants of Athens, or as the Decemvirs of 
Rome.”).  
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patrol and protect the borders of its authority. The trouble for the single executive view is that 
particularly good reason to suspect a single executive would more aggressively protect her 
purview over j policy dimensions, than would k executives each of whom has responsibility for a 
single policy dimension. If anything, unbundling authority in this way might create stronger 
incentives for protecting turf because the proportional losses to a given executive would be 
greater from Congressional incursion. In general form, the single executive view suggests 
grounds would be better patrolled by one guard than a dozen simply because the average energy 
exerted would be lower in the plural setting; the relevant criterion of course is the aggregate 
energy and it would be altogether surprising if plurals did not do better on this front than one.  
5. Uniformity  
What of other values that a single executive is supposed to serve? “A strong unitary 
executive can promote important values of accountability, coordination, and uniformity in the 
execution of laws, and to whatever extent these were the framers’ values, they are certainly now 
ours.”60 We have already suggested that the unbundled executive is preferable on accountability 
grounds, but what about coordination and uniformity in a world of unbundled executive 
authority?  
Properly cabined, the legal value of uniformity concerns the similar application of one 
legal principle in many different settings. That is, uniformity is about consistent application of 
law within a policy dimension. Serving the interests of uniformity is sometimes said to require a 
single executive, a unitary executive, or both. A single executive without unitary hierarchical 
control might not be able ensure that different subordinates always apply the law in identical or 
at least similar ways. In the same way, multiple executives might obviously apply or implement 
the same law in different ways in different contexts or to different people. In either case, 
uniformity would be undermined and faith in the rule of law sacrificed.  
Again however, the assumption of overlapping authority obfuscates matters. The 
unbundled executive framework starts with the premise that policy responsibility can be taken 
away from a general purpose executive and given to a special purpose elected official. No doubt 
this is something of an abstraction, but it is important to distinguish principled objections from 
practical objections. If policy can be distributed in this way, then uniformity is no longer an 
objection. Multiple executives with concurrent jurisdiction might produce a lack of uniformity, 
but multiple executives with exclusive jurisdiction would not—or at least would do so no more 
or no less than a single executive.  
In point of fact, there is likely to be even greater uniformity in the unbundled executive 
scheme. Why? In the single bundled executive structure, there is ultimately one person who must 
ensure the uniform implementation of federal law across dozens or even hundreds of different 
policy domains. The best case scenario is that this is enormously difficult and costly; the worst 
case scenario is that it borders on impossible. In the unbundled executive scheme, one executive 
must ensure the uniform implementation and application of federal law in a single domain. This 
is hard as well, but it is an order of magnitude less difficult than in the bundled regime. 
Moreover, the residual general purpose executive who must ensure uniformity in many policy 
domains (in the partially unbundled world) must now do so for a subset of the total set of policy 
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domains. The costs of doing so may still be substantial, but they are strictly lower than those 
faced by the general executive in the bundled regime. General purpose executives must by their 
nature focus on an expansive list of policies; specialized purpose executives need focus on only 
one. This is flip-side of the “blinders” or “tunnel-vision” problem that agencies with a single 
mission sometimes have in regulatory policy.61 Importantly, institutional designers who care a 
great deal about uniformity might well prefer strong unitary hierarchical control for each 
executive within their domain, a point which we are agnostic about. Ensuring intra-policy 
uniformity, however, does not require a single executive.  
6. Coordination 
The concern about coordination, in our view, is quite different from uniformity in that it 
focuses on inter-policy effects rather than intra-policy effects as uniformity does. The simple 
underlying claim is that a single strong executive will be better able to coordinate related policies 
and make sensible tradeoffs across those policies. If coordination is the overriding principle of 
government organization, then the unbundled executive is likely worse than a single strong 
unitary executive. Although we are open to clever counterarguments, we will assume that a 
single executive with responsibility for k policy dimensions will be better able to coordinate 
across dimensions. If inter-policy coordination is more important than accountability, uniformity, 
energy, or efficiency, then institutional designers should reject the unbundled executive. If 
coordination is one value among many, then the calculus is far more complicated, and does not 
obviously disfavor the unbundled model.  
Although coordination is a laudable goal, it is also worth noting that Congress has 
enacted, the President has signed, and the Supreme Court has upheld a series of institutional 
arrangements that are arguably inconsistent with the strong unitary executive position. Although 
these cases have generated enormous debate, current doctrine upholds as constitutional 
independent prosecutors,62 and the insulation of agency heads that are not pure or core executive 
officers from plenary Presidential control.63 The Constitution, as applied, has already sacrificed 
the pure goal of coordination in the service of other competing principles.  
We will leave the debate about whether this is desirable to others. Still, compared to the 
current state of affairs, the unbundled executive is likely superior on inter-policy coordination 
grounds. The ultimate principal—the public—would select and sanction each of the specialized 
executives. This arrangement gives the public better mechanisms for ensuring inter-policy 
coordination compared with a system in which the President appoints but cannot remove agency 
heads. Thus, as a comparative matter, the unbundled executive might be preferable on 
coordination grounds to the current state of affairs, even if a strong unitary executive with 
plenary control of the administration would be a first-best alternative along this one dimension.  
                                                 
61 See STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 11 
(Harvard 1993).  
62 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).  
63 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); United states v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Wiener 
v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). But see Myers 
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).  
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C. Strong Unitarians & Unbundled Executives  
The unitary executive fight is often miscast in politics and the media. In constitutional 
law it has little to do with the breadth of Presidential authority. Although many constitutional 
theorists have strong views about how broad executive authority is or should be, we abstract 
away from this debate entirely. Whatever one’s view about the proper scope of executive 
authority, there is always a subsequent question about how that authority should be optimally 
structured. A constitution could establish a plural executive with broad authority or a unitary 
executive with narrow authority. A constitution could unbundle executive authority irrespective 
of whether the stock of executive authority is a lot or a little.  
Properly understood, the unitary executive debate is simply about the extent of 
hierarchical control over executive or administrative officers that the Constitution establishes.64 
In the U.S. context virtually everyone favors a unitary executive of one sort or another.65 The key 
distinction is between “strong” unitary executives and “weak” unitary executives.66 There are 
many nuances in individual views within various camps, but strong unitary executive types tend 
to believe that Congress cannot insulate administrative officers from Presidential control, for 
example, by only allowing removal for cause. Weak unitary executives tend to believe that the 
President must have plenary control over certain principal purely executive officers, but that 
officers who exercise authority that is not purely executive can be insulated to a greater or lesser 
extent.67  
To over-simplify just a bit, there are two main types of justifications for a strong unitary 
executive. The first is historical or originalist: because the constitutional structure would have 
been understood at the time of the founding to create a strong unitary executive, that is the 
meaning that the constitution should be given.68 The second is more or less consequentialist.69 
                                                 
64 The Supreme Court has said that Congress may not restrict the President’s ability to remove purely 
executive officers. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Congress may not reserve for itself the authority to 
remove an executive officer by means other than impeachment. It is also apparently not permissible for Congress to 
specify a list of potential nominees from which the President may choose. It is not clear that no variant of this 
arrangement would be constitutional. However, the list-method an combination with other features of the 
appointment and authority scheme was rejected in Hechinger v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, 36 
F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court rejected a similar scheme in Metropolitan Washington Airports 
Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991). See generally Jack M. 
Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San. Diego L. Rev. 61 (2006). But this default appointment and 
removal scheme does not begin to constitute the full range of possibilities, either theoretically or empirically. 
Suppose Congress were given the authority to appoint members of the President’s cabinet or other agency heads. 
Alternatively, suppose the legislature was given no role in the appointment of these officials; either the President 
might select unilaterally or the nominee might be subject to confirmation by another political institution, perhaps a 
nonpartisan board or commission.  
65 See, e.g., TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE: THE CASE FOR THE STRONG EXECUTIVE 2. But 
see, e.g., Michael Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 827 (1996); Martin 
Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996).  
66 See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16.  
67 Id.  
68 See e.g., Steven G. Galabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Executive the Laws, 
104 YALE L. J. 541 (1994).  
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Because of other shifts in government behavior and social development, a strong unitary 
executive is laudable because it would help support a desirable constitutional structure.70  
As should be evident by now, there is much overlap between the justifications for a 
unitary executive and justifications for a single executive. Therefore many of the normative 
justifications for the strong unitary executive position are natural counter-points to our model of 
an unbundled executive. Although we suspect that most strong unitary executives would oppose 
the unbundled executive, in our view the positions are not conceptually inconsistent, at least 
setting aside the originalist or historical justification. To the extent that one favors strong 
hierarchical control of executive subordinates, it is possible to favor an unbundled executive in 
which each executive exerts complete vertical control. Each unbundled executive could remove 
subordinates at will, veto policy judgments, or even substitute his own judgment in lieu of the 
subordinate officer’s.  
We have said nothing about whether this strong form of vertical control is desirable or 
not. If it is (according to some external theory of executive authority), one could favor a strong 
unitary unbundled executive system. If not, one could favor a weak unitary unbundled executive 
system. Executive authority would be unbundled, but independent agencies and officers would 
still exist. The modest conceptual point is that the degree of vertical control of an executive over 
subordinates is distinct from the existence or extent of unbundling in the executive. Moreover, if 
we are correct that the unbundled executive better serves the underlying principles that unitary 
executives claim as their own, the case for the unbundled executive is all the stronger. 
There is a sense, however, in which the unbundled executive is at least in tension with the 
unitary executive position. A dominant, if not the dominant pragmatic justification for a unitary 
executive is that only a single executive with control over all implementation of federal law is 
democratically accountable. Insofar as this is merely a claim that a single unitary executive is 
more democratically accountable than a single executive combined with independent agencies, it 
could—but need not—be right.71 Insofar as it is a statement that a single unitary is more 
accountability than any divided or plural executive structure, we obviously disagree. The 
partially unbundled executive should produce greater accountability than the single unitary 
executive vision.  
D. Weak Unitarians and Unbundling 
To this point, we have suggested that unitary executive types should actually prefer (or at 
least not despise) the unbundled executive regime because it performs as well or better along the 
very dimensions that supposedly justify a single unitary executive. While the unitary executive 
camp is vocal, it is probably wrong to describe it as a majority position, either in academia or 
                                                                                                                                                             
69 One could also hold originalist interpretive sympathies on pragmatic grounds. See, e.g., John 
McGuinness, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalim, NW. L. REV. (2007).  
 70 See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16; Flaherty, supra note 16.  
71 See Stephenson, supra note 92.  
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politics. What of weak unitary executive types, who are willing to tolerate if not embrace 
independent agencies and/or officers who the President cannot remove except for cause?72  
Again, properly understood the unitary executive camp is mainly concerned with vertical 
control and therefore one can favor the unbundled executive independent of one’s views on 
unitary structure. Nonetheless, to the extent that weak unitary executives support many of the 
same principles that strong unitary executives do, all that we have said above applies here as 
well. What is different for weak unitary executives is support for a lack of complete presidential 
control over some administrative officers. This position could mean (a) some agencies or officers 
should be beyond the control of any executive or (b) some agencies or officers should be beyond 
the control of the executive or one executive.  
This ambiguity is not usually evidenced, because in the U.S. system, we only have one 
President. But once the possibility of several executives is one the table, there is some vagueness 
in the weak unitary executive position. For example, suppose one favors an independent 
members of the Federal Election Commission or the National Labor Relations Board, where 
independent means only that the President cannot remove a commissioner without cause. If one 
likes independence because it insulates policy decisions from voters (by weakening presidential 
control), then having a directly elected Labor Executive or Election Executive who makes those 
policy decisions will look unattractive. Unbundling gives greater control to voters, which (by 
assumption) is a state of affairs to be avoided. By the same token, if the role of an executive is 
“selection” of independent board members or commissioners, this could be accomplished with 
an unbundled executive regime as well. The directly elected Labor executive would appoint 
NLRB members who would then only be removable for cause. This is an example of a hybrid 
unbundling and insulation regime.73  
We have resisted making any claims about the desirability of political insulation, but if, 
according to some external theory of good governance, political insulation is desirable, the 
unbundled executive regime is flexible enough to accomplish it. Moreover, the unbundled Labor 
Executive is likely to have more policy-specific expertise and therefore also likely to select better 
commissioners, which could in turn increase the average quality of decision-makers. 
Alternatively, if one favors independent agencies in the current system because some policy 
decisions should be made by actors with local policy expertise who are not subject to generalist 
political pressure, then conceivably one might prefer unbundled executives without political 
insulation. Such commissioners would be either directly elected by the public or more likely 
selected by a directly elected executive, who could then remove them for any reason or no reason 
at all, much like the at will employee. Again, the unbundled executive regime would seem to 
serve those interests as well as or better than then independent officer compromise.  
                                                 
72 See generally Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established By Practice: The Theory and Operation of 
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111 (2000) (surveying evolution of growing acquiescence to 
independent agencies among weak unitarians).  
73 Cf. Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
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E. Unbundling, Concentration, & Dispersion  
Although advocates of a strong executive are many, there is also a storied tradition in 
political theory and law that is suspicious of the concentration of authority in one institutional 
actor like the President, or more apropos an even stronger executive like a dictator. Dispersing 
authority among multiple institutions is generally thought to be one the key strengths of the U.S. 
separation of powers system.74 By requiring multiple institutions or political actors to sign on to 
controversial government actions, dispersing government authority allegedly protects citizens. 
The dark side of dispersion, long appreciated, is that the benefits of efficiency and speed (and 
perhaps expertise) are forgone.75 As a matter of institutional design, there is obviously a tradeoff 
between these values; precisely what the optimal balance is will depend on time and place.76 
Many debates about the structure of executive authority are cast in terms of the centralization of 
authority. This is true of the federal United States context, but it is also true of the comparative 
literature77 and some very early work on state government structure in the 1950’s and 1960’s.78 
Political scientists and lawyers have long studied how different constitutional structures, for 
example, presidential versus parliamentary systems, produce different political outcomes, like 
competition and stability.79 More recently, economists have estimated the effect of different 
constitutional structures on economic policy, development, taxing, or spending.80 
What of these scholars who distrust the centralization of authority? How should they 
receive the unbundled executive? Whether this group of scholars should favor the unbundled 
executive depends on precisely what is to be accomplished by decentralizing authority. This is 
not always fleshed out with sufficient clarity, but one camp seems to be concerned with the sum 
of all power than is given to one executive or government official. Too much centralization, on 
this view, really implies too much power in one place. For supporters of this position, our theory 
has much to recommend it. By definition, the unbundled executive regime carves up general 
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executive authority and gives exclusively to different executive officers. By definition, the 
aggregate executive power held by any one individual in our regime is less than the aggregate 
executive power held by any individual in the single executive regime. The unbundled executive 
is as good as any other fragmentation scheme in this regard, and potentially much better.  
An alternative understanding of executive fragmentation, however, is concerned not so 
much with aggregate authority, but with the lack of veto-points that a single centralized 
executive must negotiate. It is not that one executive can exercise power over a lot of things, but 
that one executive can exercise power over the objection of any other government officials. 
When these scholars advocate fragmentation, they are really advocating councils or 
committees—multi-member decision-making bodies—the consent of all or most of which is 
necessary for action. Although we think this is not the majority position in the fragmentation 
literature, if one holds this view, the unbundled executive is not likely to be (much) more 
attractive than the current regime. To see why recall that exclusive policy authority within a 
domain is a critical element of the unbundled executive model. It is a lack of consent from other 
executives that supports greater accountability in the model. That said, the unbundled executive 
is no worse from this perspective than the current regime and to the extent that any background 
concerns about the centralization of too much power in one place linger in the shadows, the 
unbundled executive might still be preferred on those grounds.  
We hope it is clear by now that the unbundled executive does both more and less than 
avoiding the concentration of executive authority. It does less in the sense that an unbundled 
executive could have extremely broad authority say to act in the field of national defense without 
assent from other political institutions. The unbundled executive does more than simply disperse 
authority because it enhances democratic control over both the specialized executive and the 
generalized executive. It does not make it harder for unbundled executives to act, but it does 
make it easier for the public to monitor and sanction those actions.  
F. Selection Effects 
We have focused almost exclusively on incentive effects: how does the unbundling 
executive authority alter the behavior of executives? An equally important question, however, is 
whether the unbundled executive would generate selection effects.81 Would an unbundled plural 
executive scheme attract or select different candidates to executive positions and would any 
changes be normatively attractive?82 The dynamics that generate such effects are likely to be 
complex and we do not want to present a false sense of certainty. Nonetheless, some tentative 
observations are warranted.  
It is possible, but we think unlikely, that the unbundled executive would produce no 
selection effects. In this world, all the unbundled executives would like essentially the same as 
the single bundled executive looks. For this to occur there would have to be near perfect overlap 
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in the characteristics that make for a good executive across all policy domains. That is, the same 
attributes that would for a good Education Executive would have to make for a good War Powers 
Executive. No doubt, there will be some overlap—for example the ability to inspire. But the 
characteristics that make one a good war time leader are not necessarily those that make for a 
good peace time leader.83 The greater the overlap across domains, the less the selection benefit of 
the unbundled executive. If that is correct, then the unbundled executive regime would produce 
some executives that have attributes quite different from the general purpose executive, which 
means we need to know more about the direction of the effects to make a normative evaluation.  
How would the unbundled executive regime attract a different population of potential 
executive candidates to run for executive office? Suppose potential Presidential candidates are 
attracted to the possibility of being the leader of the free world rather than one of a handful of 
leaders of the free world. In that case perhaps the unbundled executive would drive some 
candidates from executive elections. This is a possible effect, but if it exists it tends to support 
rather than undermine our case.  
First, it is not at all clear that having six unbundled executives would make the office(s) 
significantly less attractive to qualified applicants. Those that run for President in the United 
States are often former Senators, Representatives, and governors. If the potential candidates 
came from Congress, the prospect of being one of many powerful national leaders was not a 
sufficient disincentive to drive them from public life. If the candidate were a former governor, 
recall that most state executives are already somewhat unbundled. If unbundling in the state 
government context nonetheless attracted high quality candidates to public life, we are hard 
pressed to see why unbundling in the national government context would not do so. Of course, 
perhaps part of what makes serving in the U.S. Congress or state governorships attractive is the 
possibility of moving on to higher office; maybe if the Presidency were unbundled even those 
offices would be less attractive? This view borders on the absurd. The probability of winning the 
Presidency is sufficiently small for any senator, congressman, or state governor, that adjusting 
such incentives is not likely to have much effect.  
It is often said that governors make good presidents because they have prior executive 
experience. The unbundled executive regime would produce a larger pool of candidates with 
some executive experience in national government; perhaps this would make presidential races 
more competitive and drive ever stronger candidates. In countries where the chief government 
executive is significantly weaker than the President is in the United States, it simply does not 
appear that lower quality politicians serve. Surely Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair were of 
roughly similar caliber to William Clinton and Ronald Reagan. It is hard to see an obvious trend 
as to intellect, strength, and leadership, as a function of Presidential versus Parliamentary 
systems.  
All that said, if the unbundled executive does attract a different pool of candidates to run 
for office, it is hard to imagine that the new pool would be of systematically lower quality. To 
make any headway on this problem, we need to know whether the unbundled executive reduces 
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the probability of selecting the truly great executive (the top part the potential executive 
distribution), reduces the probability of screening out the worst executives (eliminating the 
bottom portion of the distribution), and raises or lowers the median or average executive elected. 
The worst case scenario would be to design a system that screens out the best executives and 
selects the worst.  
The candidates who would be attracted to run for President in the bundled world, but 
would no longer be in the unbundled world, are likely to be those for whom aggregate power is 
most important: individuals for whom being the person in control of everything. Perhaps this 
group makes for good Presidents, but it seems to have most in common with megalomaniacs. In 
other countries, this would be a group of likely dictators. Making the election of aspiring 
dictators less likely hardly seems a mark of shame for any executive regime.  
What about the top of the distribution? Would the unbundled executive manage to select 
the best candidates? No electoral system is perfect, but we suspect the unbundled executive 
would perform better on this front than the bundled regime. Indeed, this is part of the beauty of 
the unbundled executive regime. In a world with a single executive, voters must trade-off 
desirable executive attributes on less important dimensions for desirable attributes on more 
important dimensions. The unbundled regime requires fewer of these tradeoffs. Voters need not 
find a single person who is both strong and wise and compassionate and so on; citizens can tailor 
the importance of a single executive attribute to a single policy domain. Our hope is that this 
would make for higher quality executives along each dimension. Each individual executive 
would be a better fit for their policy area. Therefore, the average executive quality within a 
domain would generally rise. For this not to increase average executive quality, it would have to 
be the case that in some domains, the selected unbundled executive performs much worse than 
the bundled executive. On balance, the net selection effects then would seem to be either quite 
positive or negligible.  
III. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES  
The burden of persuasion for this paper is significant, but what if all we have said thus far 
is correct and the unbundled executive would outperform the current bundled executive? Would 
this revision to the constitutional order generate other collateral consequences that are clearly 
undesirable? We think the answer to this question is yes and no. Adopting an unbundled 
executive would produce collateral consequences. Many of these of these are desirable; others 
are straightforward to remedy with relatively minor adjustments the constitutional structure. The 
relevant thought experiment is to maintain the basic contours of the U.S. constitution and 
compare the current perfectly bundled executive to a partially unbundled executive. No doubt 
this adjustment raises numerous potential complications; we note several prominent ones herein.  
A. Separation of Powers  
Suppose one wanted to maintain the rest of the constitutional structure, while adjusting 
article II to create an unbundled executive. What are the implications for separation of powers 
concerns? If the concern is balance of powers, then so long as the scope or breadth of legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers are held constant, the unbundled executive does not disrupt 
whatever parity of powers does (or does not) exist in the current system. The executive might 
have too much or too little power vis-à-vis Congress today, but the unbundled executive would 
2008 The Unbundled Executive  27 
 
not upset this balance. If the concern is avoiding encroachment, then the unbundled executive 
might actually fare better. Elected executives with responsibility only for some policy 
dimensions would be less likely (because less able) to trade legislative encroachments in one 
policy area for executive gains in another. That is, the unbundled executive helps avoid 
legislative encroachments achieved by bargain rather than by fiat.84 Many of the most prominent 
recent separation of powers cases like Bowsher v. Synar85 or United States v. Chadha86 involve 
issues of exactly this sort. Violations of separation of powers principles tend to occur with the 
consent of two branches rather than unilateral incursion by one. If the unbundled executive 
prevents even some of these, branch relations would be improved not worsened.  
However, because the unbundled executive increases public control over executive 
policy, the unbundled executive might be more constrained than the bundled executive. It seems 
awkward to call this executive weaker instead of more accountable, but for the sake of argument 
suppose this does makes the executive less powerful relative to the legislature. The unbundled 
executive still does not produce legislative dominance.  
The reason is that the extent of unbundling in the executive branch is not the only 
dimension along which institutional arrangements can be adjusted. The unbundled executive 
could easily be adjusted to preclude independent officers—that is to create stronger unitary 
control that would enhance the power of various unbundled executives. Other alternatives might 
also ratchet up executive power to easily compensate for any marginal reduction stemming from 
unbundling. More important, the extent of executive power has grown exponentially since the 
founding. Congress’ powers have grown, but clearly at a less rapid pace. If the founders’ intent 
was to produce an initial balance or parity among the branches, surely it is the executive branch’s 
power that is now out of whack. If the unbundled executive weakens the executive—although 
again, we think it does not—it might actually bring the branches closer to parity, bringing the 
balance of power closer to that originally contemplated and in the process enhancing the degree 
of accountability in the executive branch.  
B. Presentment  
The unbundled executive also raises novel questions about other constitutional structures. 
For example, article I section 7 requires bicameralism and presentment to enact a valid law.87 
With multiple executives, who would sign? All the executives, none, one? Questions like these 
are far from the path on which we started, and therefore our views are necessarily tentative. 
However, several scenarios present themselves.  
The most likely one would be for a Congress or an institutional actor like the House or 
Senate parliamentarian to designate the executive with the relevant policy authority. 
                                                 
84 Virtually all modern separation of powers cases are the result of a consensual bargain between the 
President and the United States. The cases challenge statutes passed by Congress and signed by the President. 
Characterizing most of these as power grabs by the legislature or the president is awkward. Both institutions 
consented. This is not to say that such arrangements are or ought to be permitted by the Constitution. But it is 
important to bear in mind that the unpermitted arrangements are generally supported by Congress and the Executive.  
85 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
86 462 U.S. 919 (1983) 
87 U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 7.  
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Transportation legislation would be signed by the transportation executive. This could create the 
opportunity for gaming, of course. Legislation could be framed as a transportation bill when in 
fact it was a welfare bill. But these are standard problems within Congress as well. House and 
Senate rules typically require that legislation be referred to the committee with the most relevant 
jurisdiction.88 Historically some gaming has emerged, but for the most part, committees guard 
their turf and bills are sent to the appropriate one. Loose norms have generally been sufficient to 
prevent a breakdown of the rules. If the practice works reasonably well within Congress, there is 
no reason to think it would work substantially worse across branches.  
Even better would be to designate links between Congressional committees and special 
unbundled executives ex ante. Then decisions about which committee to send a bill to would 
produce an automatic decision about which executive to present the bill. Here too there could be 
gamesmanship. Legislation with no possibility of being signed by the transportation executive 
might be packaged as welfare legislation or vice versa. Although our intuition is that these 
problems are not nearly as severe as others that plague the current state of affairs, our system 
cannot avoid them entirely. Still, the unbundled executive entails a straightforward method of 
disciplining such behavior. If the transportation executive signs welfare legislation, and if voters 
care, it is easier to express displeasure with electoral sanctions in the unbundled executive world 
than in the bundled executive world. 
C. Logrolls 
If unbundled executives could only sign legislation that is within their policy domain, 
would that not eliminate the possibility of logrolls and omnibus legislation? Within a policy 
domain, big legislative packages and logrolls would still be possible. Therefore, it seems likely 
that the current practice of enacting big transportation bills every several years would continue; 
such legislative packages do contain and would continue to contain plenty of logrolls and side-
deals, for better or for worse.89  
Across policy domains, however, logrolls and omnibus legislation would be marginally 
more difficult. This does not seem especially tragic and there are those that would applaud the 
effect. Some logrolls however are welfare enhancing rather than wasteful. If inter-policy logrolls 
are especially important according to some external theory of the good, then our system could be 
adjusted to allow for them. Consider the following proposal: legislation covering two policy 
domains must be presented to both the relevant executives. If both sign, the bill becomes law. If 
neither signs, the legislature could override the veto with a supermajority vote of 2/3. If one 
executive signs and the other does not, the legislature could override the single veto with a vote 
of 3/5 (or some other lesser variant). Upon more serious consideration, these alternative regimes 
might be good or bad, but the basic unbundled executive structure is flexible enough to 
incorporate such changes or not as others prefer.  
                                                 
88 See, e.g., Rule XVII, Standing Rules of the U.S. Senate.  
89 The single-subject limitation is supposed to preclude logrolls in which policies favored only by a 
minority of politicians or voters are enacted together. See Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the 
Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803 (2006); Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on 
Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38 
HARV. J. LEGISLATION 103 (2001). Michael Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 803 (2006). 
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D. Administrative Agencies 
 Although the executive has many important duties, managing administrative agencies and 
regulatory policy is surely near the top of the list. Would the unbundled executive turn 
administrative law and regulatory policy into a greater morass than it is already? We cannot say 
that there would be no complications, but the most obvious trouble spots do not suggest a drastic 
conceptual overhaul is necessary. Consider the dominant trend over the past several decades 
towards more centralization and coordination of administrative agencies?90 Does this not suggest 
we are swimming upstream in current even stronger than it first appears?  
Note that one of the main justifications for increasing presidential control over agencies 
has to do with democratic accountability.91 The president is directly elected by a national 
constituency and agency heads are not. More control over agencies is better for democracy and 
majoritarian preferences.92 But in the unbundled executive world each executive is directly 
elected. There is no question that a directly elected Environment Executive is vastly more 
democratically accountable than a single general purpose executive who oversees environmental 
policy, along with hundreds of other policies, indirectly.  
The other main justification given for greater centralized control of the bureaucracy is the 
need for inter-risk or inter-policy tradeoffs—roughly speaking this is coordination concern. Just 
as agencies with a single mission might pursue policy goals with blinders, so too might 
unbundled executives.93 This lack of coordination could produce bad policy, although whether it 
would typically produce policy that is better or worse on average seems an open question. The 
simplest thing to say is that this is a real concern. The comparative advantage of the unbundled 
executive, however, is that if the public is upset that some unbundled executive is pursuing 
policy goals in too single-minded a way, then the public can vote that person out office. The 
relevant unbundled executive has done a bad job; our structure provides a more effective way to 
correct this problem than the current bundled structure.  
Another alternative, which we have not seriously explored, would be to create an inter-
policy tradeoff executive. Her policy domain would be inter-policy or inter-risk trades and 
nothing else. A public frustrated with the tunnel vision of unbundled executives could either 
discipline the executive behaving with tunnel vision or discipline the coordinating executive. In 
effect, there could be an unbundled executive in charge of OIRA.94 The details of whether the 
                                                 
90 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (documenting and 
defending the extensive mechanisms by which Presidents exert control over administrative agencies). See also Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (2007); Nicholas 
Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, OMB and the Centralized Review of Regulation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. (2006).  
91 But see Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New 
President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557 (2003) (policies may be less majoritarian if old presidents can entrench 
policies); Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 758 (2001) (“many observers tend to 
overestimate the significance of elections”). 
92 But see Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy (unpublished manuscript 
2007).  
93 See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 11 
(1993) (describing tunnel vision of specialist agencies).  
94 See generally Nichols D. Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Review of Regulation, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1260 (2006).  
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OIRA executive could veto or initiate new rules would have to be worked out, and we certainly 
have not done so. However, we suspect one could do so in a sensible way that would not 
debilitate either the administrative or the unbundled executive scheme.  
The unbundled executive might even help solve some standard problems in 
administrative law. For example, it has long been unclear how courts should deal with deference 
to agencies with overlapping jurisdiction.95 Standard deference doctrines encourage courts to 
defer to agencies, but when agencies share jurisdiction, courts must decide to which agency 
deference is owed. In the current regime, this is a problem mainly because of overlapping 
jurisdiction; it is easy to solve by creating agency jurisdiction that is exclusive rather than 
shared.96 Similarly, the unbundled executive with exclusive policy authority actually solves 
Chevron97 problems rather than creates them. There is a clear institutional actor—the unbundled 
executive—to whom deference is owed or not, as standard deference doctrine dictates. By 
trending towards, indeed by requiring, exclusive policy jurisdiction, the unbundled executive 
would resolve some of these standard difficulties in administrative law doctrine.  
E. Majoritarianism & Minoritarianism 
We have suggested that a major advantage of the unbundled executive is greater 
democratic responsiveness. We have urged that the structure enhances accountability. Another 
line of attack on our argument would go as follows. Institutional design in a constitutional 
democracy must balance many goals. Our constitution hardly cries out as a majoritarian 
document. It is riddled with provisions that make it harder rather than easier to enact majoritarian 
views. Protecting minority views is a competing value and it seems likely the unbundled 
executive would produce too much accountability. We agree that the constitution does and 
should balance the implementation of majoritarian views with the protection of minority 
positions. If the existing constitution gets the mix exactly right, then any deviation towards more 
or less accountability would be suboptimal, our proposal included.  
However, there is a way in which the unbundled executive is, or could be, minoritarian, 
albeit in a subtle way. Recall that as executive authority is unbundled, there is a corresponding 
increase in monitoring costs. Suppose executive authority was unbundled such that there were 20 
executives. When policy issues are unbundled by creating specialized executives with exclusive 
with authority to make policy, the costs of participation for voters, e.g., gathering information 
and voting, increase. A plausible inference is that as a result of increasing costs, participation is 
lower in unbundled elections or that there is falloff such that voters vote for some but not all of 
the unbundled executives on the ballot.98 A citizen will be is more likely to participate in the 
                                                 
95 See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. 
REV. 201.  
96 Id. (arguing that Congress might intentionally generate exclusive or concurrent agency jurisdiction to 
encourage or discourage agencies from regulating in new policy domains).  
97 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For a more elaborate 
discussion, see Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676 (2007) 
(discussing evolution of doctrine along with current issues faced by courts in applying deference rules).  
98 There is empirical evidence to support the supposition that participation is selective in unbundled 
elections. For example, Terry Moe has shown that teachers union members are up to 7 times more likely to 
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executive election for the issue she cares about most. Citizens with high interest in the issue are 
more likely to constitute a majority of voters for the given unbundled executive office, even if 
they are a minority of all voters. This is essentially a selective participation effect, in which 
minorities will control elections (and by extension outcomes) in the policy domains they care 
most about. This result is not inevitable, but it is entirely plausible. Thus, while the general 
theme of the unbundled executive is majoritarian, there are scenarios in which the unbundled 
executive can protect and even enhance the ability of minorities to control politics.  
F. Emergencies & Change 
 Much of our analysis is static in an important sense. It assumes that the relevant policies 
dimensions can be identified ex ante and that a specific unbundled executive could be elected to 
control those policies. In the real world, of course, things are not so straightforward. New policy 
dimensions emerge; others fade away. When there is but one general purpose executive, these 
shifts take care of themselves. When authority is unbundled, matters are more complicated. If the 
bundled executive is better able to adapt or deal with emergencies, is this not a significant knock 
on the unbundled executive?99 
 The ability of institutional structures to incorporate changing circumstances is important, 
but there are two reasons the unbundled executive does not falter here. First, throughout our 
discussion, we have emphasized the optimality of partial unbundling. At no point have we 
suggested that perfect unbundling would be desirable. Thus, in our proposed regime, there is 
always what might be termed a residual executive, the executive who has authority over all 
issues that have not been unbundled. At the margin, this executive is more accountable than a 
single general purpose executive.  
When new policies or problems arise, the residual executive can address them just as the 
existing totally bundled executive can do. This is true of gradual change, but it is also true of 
more acute challenges like emergencies. The unbundled executive is not debilitated when 
emergency strikes, or at least is no more debilitated than the bundled executive. The ability to 
react to subtle or sudden changes in social circumstances is a value of both the current and 
proposed regimes.  
This response addresses what we take to be the more severe concern about the unbundled 
executive. But what if new issues emerge that would best be unbundled or previously unbundled 
regimes wane in importance? This problem has been faced by state and local governments for 
many years. New elected offices are created with some frequency in the United States. There are 
costs to doing so, but they are not particularly insurmountable. The structure of the executive 
branch has changed enormously from the founding; today’s cabinet level officers are not the 
same as those established early in our history. Although it is somewhat rarer to eliminate offices, 
this also occurs at all levels of government. As society changes, political institutions do as well. 
                                                                                                                                                             
participate in school board elections than the average registered voter. See Terry Moe, Teachers Unions and School 
Board Elections, in Beseiged: School Boards and the Future of Education Politics (William Howell, ed., 2005). 
99 Cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure, 92 VA. L. REV. 1091 
(2006); Adrian Vermeule, Self Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 631 
(2006); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004); Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605 (2003).  
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If old unbundled executives should be eliminated and new unbundled executives created, so be 
it. These design problems are real, but they are third-order considerations. If the unbundled 
executive is to be rejected, we doubt it will be on these grounds.  
CONCLUSION 
Our vision of the unbundled executive is preliminary, and perhaps it is a singularly 
unlikely one as well. Still, unbundling executive authority seems to systematically produce 
desirable effects on political institutions in representative democracies.100 Reform movements in 
the states have long experimented with different structures of executive authority, and we 
suggest constitutional design more generally might benefit from some of these lessons.101 At a 
minimum, our work provides a counterweight to many wrong-head assumptions in modern 
constitutional theory. Our work is mainly about constitutional possibilities rather than 
constitutional realities. We certainly do not claim that the most sensible or even any plausible 
reading of the U.S. Constitution establishes a plural unbundled executive; but perhaps it should. 
And to the extent the current constitutional structure would allow for modest adjustments toward 
the unbundled executive ideal, our work suggests such reforms would produce a government 
structure more in keeping with the democratic ideals most commonly said to justify the single 
unitary executive. The plural executive position has long been lampooned in constitutional 
theory. The unbundled executive suggests it should be lampooned somewhat less. 
                                                 
100 But see William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and 
Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446 (2006).  
101 Thomas R. Dye, Executive Power and Public Policy in the States, 22 Western Pol. Q. 926 (1969).  
  
Table 1. State Government Elected Officials, 1967-1992 
   
  1992 1987 1977 1967 
Total 18,828 18,134 15,294 13,038 
Members of state legislatures 7,461 7,461 7,562 7,613 
Members of other elected boards 1,331 1,300 1,229 1,230 
Other elected officials 10,036 9,373 6,503 4,195 
 
Source: Census of Governments 
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Table 2. Elected Offices by State, 1967 and 1992 
      
 
Total Members of legislatures 
Members of other 
elected boards 
Other elected 
officials 
  1992 1967 1992 1967 1992 1967 1992 1967 
Alabama  436 275 140 141 11 3 285 131 
Alaska  255 415 60 60 139 341 56 14 
Arizona  239 228 90 90 117 120 32 18 
Arkansas  349 205 135 135 0 0 214 70 
California  226 177 120 120 4 4 102 53 
Colorado  280 214 100 100 16 11 164 103 
Connecticut  333 352 187 213 0 0 146 139 
Delaware  80 71 62 53 12 12 6 6 
Florida  934 354 160 165 0 3 774 186 
Georgia  465 389 236 259 5 5 224 125 
Hawaii  91 89 76 76 13 11 2 2 
Idaho  171 141 126 105 0 0 45 36 
Illinois  623 633 177 235 9 9 437 389 
Indiana  506 386 150 150 0 0 356 236 
Iowa  319 275 150 185 0 0 169 90 
Kansas  343 240 165 165 10 0 168 75 
Kentucky  565 275 138 138 3 3 424 134 
Louisiana  629 404 144 144 155 92 330 168 
Maine  210 186 186 185 15 0 9 1 
Maryland  356 261 188 185 0 0 168 76 
Massachusetts 225 303 200 280 8 17 17 6 
Michigan  652 310 148 148 32 33 472 129 
Minnesota  623 283 201 202 0 3 422 78 
Mississippi  296 263 174 174 6 6 116 83 
Missouri  994 553 197 197 448 236 349 120 
Montana  201 203 150 159 0 3 51 41 
Nebraska  201 114 49 49 21 17 131 48 
Nevada  141 101 63 60 22 14 56 27 
New Hampshire  430 430 424 424 5 0 1 6 
New Jersey  121 90 120 89 0 0 1 1 
New Mexico  220 173 112 112 13 13 95 48 
New York  950 417 211 207 0 0 739 210 
North Carolina 593 284 170 170 0 0 423 114 
North Dakota 205 181 159 146 3 3 43 32 
Ohio  231 202 132 132 21 23 78 47 
Oklahoma  362 250 149 147 3 3 210 100 
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Oregon  290 156 90 90 0 0 200 66 
Pennsylvania 1,200 464 253 253 0 0 947 211 
Rhode Island 155 155 150 150 0 0 5 5 
South Carolina 195 198 170 174 0 0 25 24 
South Dakota 155 147 105 110 3 3 47 34 
Tennessee  321 257 132 132 3 3 186 122 
Texas  815 534 181 181 18 24 616 329 
Utah  200 140 104 97 9 5 87 38 
Vermont  186 186 180 180 0 0 6 6 
Virginia  143 143 140 140 0 0 3 3 
Washington  537 452 147 148 207 210 183 94 
West Virginia 205 175 134 134 0 0 71 41 
Wisconsin  450 193 132 133 0 0 318 60 
Wyoming 121 111 94 91 0 0 27 20 
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Table 3. Elected Officials per Capita, by State, 1967 and 1992 
  State Government Local Government 
  Total Officials 
Per 10,000 
Population Total Officials 
Per 10,000 
Population 
State 1992 1967 1992 1967 1992 1967 1992 1967 
United States  18,828   13,038  0.76 0.67  493,830   508,720  19.9 26 
Alabama   436   275  1.08 0.78  3,949   3,785  9.8 10.8 
Alaska   255   415  4.64 15.26  1,674   557  30.4 20.5 
Arizona   239   228  0.65 1.41  3,050   1,949  8.3 12.1 
Arkansas   349   205  1.48 1.05  8,059   10,084  34.3 51.6 
California   226   177  0.08 0.09  18,699   18,079  6.3 9.6 
Colorado   280   214  0.85 1.08  8,325   6,478  25.3 32.8 
Connecticut   333   352  1.01 1.22  8,814   10,509  26.8 36.6 
Delaware   80   71  1.20 1.39  1,091   800  16.4 15.6 
Florida   934   354  0.72 0.60  4,654   4,716  3.6 7.9 
Georgia   465   389  0.72 0.87  6,064   6,837  9.4 15.3 
Hawaii   91   89  0.82 1.24  92   95  0.8 1.3 
Idaho   171   141  1.70 2.03  4,604   3,714  45.7 53.5 
Illinois   623   633  0.55 0.59  41,713   35,721  36.5 33.3 
Indiana   506   386  0.91 0.78  11,118   10,898  20.1 22.2 
Iowa   319   275  1.15 1.00  16,160   20,726  58.2 75.4 
Kansas   343   240  1.38 1.07  18,552   18,089  74.9 80.4 
Kentucky   565   275  1.53 0.86  6,495   6,286  17.6 19.8 
Louisiana   629   404  1.49 1.12  4,422   4,357  10.5 12.1 
Maine   210   186  1.71 1.89  6,346   6,665  51.7 67.8 
Maryland   356   261  0.74 0.72  1,767   1,680  3.7 4.7 
Massachusetts  225   303  0.37 0.56  21,948   11,535  36.5 21.4 
Michigan   652   310  0.70 0.37  18,052   23,074  19.4 27.6 
Minnesota   623   283  1.42 0.79  18,247   26,007  41.9 72.7 
Mississippi   296   263  1.15 1.13  4,458   4,498  17.4 19.3 
Missouri   994   553  1.94 1.23  16,287   16,660  31.8 37 
Montana   201   203  2.52 2.89  4,905   4,880  61.5 69.5 
Nebraska   201   114  1.27 0.78  13,698   19,159  86.8 131.6 
Nevada   141   101  1.17 2.22  1,077   797  9 17.6 
New Hampshire   430   430  3.88 6.31  6,917   5,808  62.4 85.3 
New Jersey   121   90  0.16 0.13  8,921   9,362  11.6 13.6 
New Mexico   220   173  1.45 1.69  1,981   1,997  13.1 19.5 
New York   950   417  0.53 0.23  24,982   24,091  13.9 13.2 
North Carolina  593   284  0.89 0.57  5,227   5,220  7.9 10.4 
North Dakota  205   181  3.21 2.78  15,277   16,145  239.1 248.4 
Ohio   231   202  0.21 0.20  19,135   20,636  17.7 20 
Oklahoma   362   250  1.15 1.02  8,627   9,210  27.5 37.5 
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Oregon   290   156  1.02 0.80  7,543   7,529  26.6 38.5 
Pennsylvania  1,200   464  1.01 0.40  29,276   33,890  24.6 29.3 
Rhode Island  155   155  1.55 1.73  983   1,125  9.8 12.5 
South Carolina  195   198  0.56 0.77  3,748   2,880  10.8 11.1 
South Dakota  155   147  2.23 2.16  9,529   16,161  136.9 237 
Tennessee   321   257  0.66 0.66  6,629   7,620  13.6 19.6 
Texas   815   534  0.48 0.50  26,813   22,504  15.8 20.9 
Utah   200   140  1.16 1.39  2,511   2,081  14.6 20.6 
Vermont   186   186  3.30 4.59  8,348   7,059  148.3 174.3 
Virginia   143   143  0.23 0.32  2,961   3,444  4.8 7.6 
Washington   537   452  1.10 1.52  7,187   7,497  14.8 25.2 
West Virginia  205   175  1.14 0.98  2,567   3,373  14.3 18.8 
Wisconsin   450   193  0.92 0.46  17,379   20,165  35.5 48.5 
Wyoming  121   111  2.67 3.37  2,621   2,288  57.7 69.5 
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Table 4. Independently Elected State Offices 
 
Office or Function 
Number of States 
where Elected 
 2002 1977
Governor 50 50
Lt. Governor 45 41
Attorney General 43 42
Treasurer 38 39
Secretary of State 38 37
Post-Audit 19 17
Comptroller 16 9
Education 15 20
Pre-Audit 15 12
Agriculture 12 11
Insurance 12 8
Public Utility Regulation 7 8
Community Affairs 6 0
Finance 5 0
Labor 4 4
Election Administration 4 0
Revenue 2 1
Banking 2 0
Adjutant General 1 1
Natural Resources 1 1
Social Services 1 0
Transportation 0 1
 
Source: Book of the States 
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Table 5. Number of Independently Elected Executive Offices, by State, 2002 and 1977 
 
State 2002 1977
Alabama 7 7
Alaska 3 2
Arizona 7 5
Arkansas 5 6
California 10 8
Colorado 5 5
Connecticut 6 7
Delaware 7 6
Florida 11 9
Georgia 10 5
Hawaii 2 2
Idaho 11 8
Illinois 8 8
Indiana 8 8
Iowa 7 7
Kansas 6 6
Kentucky 8 8
Louisiana 8 9
Maine 1 1
Maryland 4 4
Massachusetts 6 6
Michigan 4 4
Minnesota 6 5
Mississippi 9 12
Missouri 6 6
Montana 7 6
Nebraska 6 7
Nevada 6 7
New Hampshire 1 1
New Jersey 1 1
New Mexico 7 6
New York 7 3
North Carolina 10 10
North Dakota 11 12
Ohio 8 6
Oklahoma 8 10
Oregon 8 6
Pennsylvania 6 4
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Rhode Island 6 5
South Carolina 11 10
South Dakota 8 7
Tennessee 2 2
Texas 10 7
Utah 6 5
Vermont 7 6
Virginia 3 3
Washington 11 9
West Virginia 6 6
Wisconsin 6 5
Wyoming 9 4
Average 6.72 6.04
 
Source: Book of the States 
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